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ABSTRACT 
Since the development of the phenomenological method by Husserl, a variety of thinkers 
and researchers have contributed to an intense debate regarding the ontological and 
epistemological bases of Phenomenology, as well as its applicability to the inquiry of the 
human condition. This dialogue has spun an area of phenomenological research known as 
existential-phenomenological psychology, which has been systematically explored by a 
number of researchers in different fields, in the last decades. The present paper furthers 
an earlier argument for the use of phenomenological methods, and in particular, those of 
existential-phenomenological psychology, to study IS-related phenomena. It discusses 
how such methods can be approached from a critical standpoint, in contrast with a pure 
hermeneutical one, thus allowing for the realization of emancipatory ideals in often 
unanticipated ways. An example from a study of IT-driven radical change is used to 
illustrate the argument. 
Key-words: phenomenology; critical social theory; research methodology; organizational 
change. 
RESUMO 
Desde o desenvolvimento do método fenomenológico por Husserl, inúmeros pensadores 
e pesquisadores contribuíram para um intenso debate a respeito das suas bases ontoló-
gicas e epistemoógicas, assim como sobre a sua aplicabilidade para analisar a condição 
humana. Este diálogo resultou emu ma area da pesquisa fenomenológica conhecida 
como psicologia fenomenológica existencial, que tem sido explorada sistematicamente 
por diversos pesquisadores de diferentes campos nas últimas décadas. Este artigo procu-
ra aprofundar-se em um argumento antigo a favor do uso de métodos fenomenológicos 
e, em particular, da psicologia fenomenológica existencial para estudar fenômenos 
relativos à área de Sistemas de Informação. Discute-se como tais métodos podem ser 
utilizados a partir de uma perspectiva crítica, em contraste a um uso puramente herme-
nêutico, assim possibilitando o atingimento de ideais emancipatórios de formas normal-
mente não antecipadas. Um exemplo de estudo de uma mudança radical pela introdução 
de TI é utilizado para ilustrar a argumentação proposta. 
Palavras-chave: fenomenologia; teoriacrítica; metodologia de pesquisa; mudança organiza-
cional. 
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1 INTRODUÇÃO 
Edmund Husserl (1960, 1967, 1970) introduced transcendental 
phenomenology as a science of human experience in the beginning of the 
last century. He believed that philosophy must provide the basic 
knowledge upon which all other sciences may be built. According to 
Husserl, the natural sciences accept the world as we perceive it, 
attributing to it objective characteristics that make it independent of our 
acts of perception and deduction, i.e., of our consciousness. Husserl 
contended that the assumptions that are implicit in natural sciences in fact 
needed to be examined. Phenomenology would then supply the means to 
investigate the validity of such presuppositions, requiring, thereby, “a 
radicalism of foundation, a reduction to absolute presuppositionlessness 
[sic], a fundamental method through which the philosopher at the 
beginning secures an absolute foundation for himself” (KOCKELMANS, 
1967, p. 29). As illustrated in Husserl’s investigations (e.g., 1967), the 
ideal of presuppositionlessness actually translates into an encompassing 
examination of all types of assumptions. Congruently, it requires that 
there be no metaphysical or existential postulation unless there is a 
special reason for explicitly positing it. Moreover, it implies the rejection of 
all prejudgments (FARBER, 1967). 
From the previous paragraph, one could naturally assume an intrinsic 
connection between the phenomenological thought and Critical Social 
Theory (CST). As one of the leading expressions of the neohumanist 
paradigm (as defined in HIRSCHHEIM & KLEIN, 1994; HIRSCHHEIM, KLEIN & 
LYYTINEN, 1995), CST is primarily concerned with the critical examination 
of the implicit validity claims inherent to all social activity, and the 
emancipation of individuals from socio-historical conditions whose bases 
are found on the oppression and distortion of free, comprehensive, 
logically coherent exchanges of ideas. Nevertheless, transcendental 
phenomenology and its later developments have led mainly to the 
establishment of interpretive, hermeneutical research traditions that lack 
the critical perspective and the transformative interest and potential that 
are a fundamental characteristic of the neohumanist school. This is 
especially true in the phenomenological works developed by researchers 
of Information Systems (IS) and organizational phenomena. 
Although most interpretivist research methods are informed by 
phenomenological thought (e.g., BOLAND, 1985; KLEIN & MYERS, 1999), 
the use of traditional phenomenological methods in studies of organizational 
and IS-related processes is actually relatively recent. One of the first 
advocates of their application in the IS field was Richard Boland. In a 
synthesis of his early work, Boland (1985) argued that the study of the 
design, implementation, and use of information systems is essentially a 
hermeneutic task, in which designers and users attempt to interpret each 
other’s intentions, as well as the socially constructed organizational reality 
where their interactions take place. Based on these ideas, he maintained 
that phenomenology is the preferred method to study such phenomena, 
since it “accepts meaning as the central problem on which all other 
knowledge of the social world will depend” (p. 196). 
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More recently, Chikudate (1999) adopted a framework based on 
phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge to study the experiences 
of Japanese managers in change processes. He was able to identify 
several socio-historical processes that contribute to the maintenance of 
the status quo in Japanese companies, and thereby, to the high rate of 
failure of organizational change efforts in that country. He concluded that 
the only way of revitalizing Japanese businesses is “to drastically 
deconstruct the structure of institutionalized obstructs that have been 
oppressing the self-confrontation within Japanese business communities” 
(p. 84). In this way, Chikudate’s study demonstrates the usefulness of the 
phenomenological method to unveil the interconnections between 
phenomena that take place at the individual level, and the broader 
structures that are prevalent in society at a particular time. It is important 
to note, therefore, that, even though the research methodology that 
guided the inquiry was clearly phenomenological, both conceptually and in 
structure, it led to conclusions that at least imply the critical, socio-
historical standpoint that is characteristic in the CST school. 
The present paper sets forth the argument that phenomenological 
research methods are based on assumptions that, not only are fully 
compatible with the principles of CST and the neohumanist paradigm, but 
also, when developed to their fullest potential, are conducive to the 
unveiling of unwarranted assumptions in a socio-historical context. In this 
way, it fully supports Boland’s position, hoping to encourage and provide 
initial guidance to IS researchers, as far as the application of 
phenomenological methods is concerned. The paper starts with a brief 
presentation of the principles of neohumanism and Critical Social Theory. 
This is followed by summary of the fundamental concepts of 
phenomenology and existential-phenomenological research, one of the 
later developments of Husserl’s ideas. It concludes with a discussion of the 
synergies between the two schools of thought, illustrated with a brief 
example from a study of IT-driven radical organizational change (MORENO, 
2001). 
2 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (CST) 
Developed by the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) 
and later by Jürgen Habermas, Critical Social Theory (CST) has been 
treated in the literature as a major expression of the neohumanist 
paradigm (e.g., ALVESSON & WILLMOTT, 1992; HIRSCHHEIM & KLEIN, 
1994; HIRSCHHEIM et al., 1995; NGWENYAMA, 1991). The main ideal in 
neohumanism is the emancipation of individuals from all physical, 
psychological and social constraints that prevent them from fully 
developing their inherent potentialities (HIRSCHHEIM & KLEIN, 1994; 
HIRSCHHEIM et al., 1995). Radical change, based on rational, ample, and 
unrestricted critique of the status quo, is the fundamental means to the 
realization of such objective (HABERMAS, 1985a, 1985b). Congruent with 
the neohumanist principles, CST asserts that the acquisition of knowledge 
about social reality requires the achievement of consensus through a 
rational discourse, i.e., through an undistorted debate among equally well-
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informed peers. Its major value is the transformation of historically 
constituted social reality to allow for the maximal realization of human 
needs and potentials. Emancipation in CST refers essentially to processes 
“through which individuals and groups become freed from repressive 
social and ideological conditions, in particular those that place socially 
unnecessary restrictions upon the development and articulation of human 
consciousness” (ALVESSON & WILLMOTT, 1992, p. 432). The underlying 
idea here is that social arrangements must not be reified (i.e., perceived 
as a given objects of an external reality), but rather understood as 
resulting from (and constraining) human activity. 
The main ontological assumption that guides the neohumanist 
perspective, as defined by Hirschheim et al. (1995), is that the individual’s 
consciousness and the external social world are expressions of a same 
reality, and coexist in an ongoing state of interaction, each unavoidably 
and permanently influencing the other. Furthermore, the outer social 
context is assumed to have a dual nature, encompassing objective and 
subjective elements, such as physical artifacts and social conventions, 
respectively. Nevertheless, despite their inherent interconnectedness, 
individuals’ consciousness and social reality may be separated by different 
types of barriers (e.g., barriers of time and space, psychological 
compulsions, communication distortions, and ideology). These essential 
ideas underlay the critique set forth in CST of the traditional positivist 
scientific methods, especially as they are applied to the investigation of 
the social world. Critical theorists dispute the presumed detachment of 
positivist research from its socio-historical context; that is, they reject the 
separation of value and inquiry, knowledge and action, and challenge the 
unity of the positivist scientific method with regard to social affairs 
(NGWENYAMA, 1991, p. 268). CST adopts pluralistic methods of inquiry 
supported by interpretivism to understand the meanings associated with 
social activity “from within the social context and life worlds of [human, or 
more specifically, organizational] actors” (NGWENYAMA & LEE, 1997, p. 
151). At the same time, it addresses the conflictual nature of social 
interactions, and the possibility of the intentional introduction of 
distortions in people’s conceptualizations of reality as a means to favor 
groups’ or individuals’ interests. In his Theory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas (1985a, 1985b) associates such distortions with communicative 
acts that are false, incomplete, insincere, or unwarranted. These 
characteristics imply Habermas’ view of individuals as intelligent human 
actors, capable of critically evaluating the different validity claims that are 
embedded in their communicative acts, i.e., contextually grounded verbal 
or extra-verbal social interactions directed at establishing interpersonal 
relations (HABERMAS, 1985a). 
The Theory of Communicative Action defines four basic types of 
intentional behaviors or social actions (HABERMAS, 1985a):  
 instrumental: behavior oriented to achieving rational objectives; 
other people are seen by the actor as objects (resources) amenable 
to manipulation; involves validity claims associated with 
appropriateness (in a given context), efficiency and effectiveness; 
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 communicative: action related to achieving and maintaining mutual 
understanding; depends on a common language and shared 
understanding about the context in which the action takes place; 
involves validity claims of clarity, completeness, contextuality, and 
truthfulness; 
 discursive: action oriented toward achieving or restoring agreement 
and redeeming validity claims, based on a common medium of 
communication, shared protocols of interaction, and a priori 
knowledge of the ground rules of discourse; evokes validity claims of 
clarity, contextuality, and sometimes, truthfulness and sincerity; 
 strategic: action associated with influencing and changing the 
behaviors of others so as to make them compatible with one’s 
interests; participants see each other as persons capable of 
intelligent action; involves validity claims of contextuality. 
Independently of the type of research methods employed (positivist 
or interpretivist), the development of scientific knowledge about the social 
world necessarily evolves through a series of social actions. Therefore, it is 
intrinsically connected to a number of validity claims that must be 
continually vindicated. A critical perspective requires the assessment 
process to involve not only the scientific community that “generates” 
scientific knowledge, but also non-scientists to whom such knowledge is 
related. In fact, Harbermas understands Science and its project of 
improving the human condition as a collaborative effort between those 
two communities. In his view, true knowledge can only be created when 
validity claims are evaluated through critical reflection in ideal discourse 
situations, where consensus is achieved by force of better argument, 
rather than by imposition, manipulation or distortion of information 
(HABERMAS, 1985a, 1985b). Accordingly, CST sees communication as a 
key factor for successful knowledge building. 
Ngwenyama (1991, pp. 272-273) translated the essential elements of 
Critical Social Theory into five requirements to which any critical research 
methodology must comply:  
1. methods must be practice oriented focusing on change; 
2. they must support inquiry into the organizational process and its 
social context; 
3. they must be sensitive to individual as well as organizational needs; 
4. they must be collaborative, supporting free and open participants; 
5. they must be critically self-reflective. 
The emancipatory ideal of neohumanism is not explicit in these 
exigencies. Nevertheless, the requirements should be taken in the context 
of CST, where they can be meaningfully connected to the ultimate 
objective of emancipation. For instance, the call for practice and change 
reflects the active pursue for freedom inherent to the neohumanist 
paradigm. The claims for free collaboration and critical reflection manifest 
the ideal discourse condition, indispensable for the acquisition of the 
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knowledge necessary to the emancipation process. Finally, the demands 
for the consideration of individual, organizational and broader social 
elements mirror the ontological assumptions of neohumanism, as well as 
the three types of interest defined by Habermas. Hence, when considered 
in the light of CST, the above set of requirements seems to cover 
adequately the essential principles that must be salient in any 
neohumanist research methodology. 
3 EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
Husserl (1960, 1967) believed the investigation of claims about reality 
is ultimately related to the intuitive way in which the world reveals itself in 
our consciousness. Accordingly, the starting point of phenomenology is the 
immediately given, essential impressions of the world in consciousness, 
which are referred to as phenomena. The term essence, as used by 
Husserl, refers to “that which is common or universal, the condition or 
quality without which a thing would not be what it is” (MOUSTAKAS, 1994, 
p. 100). Phenomena are necessarily embedded in a web of meanings, 
which are related to previous experiences, to things we have learned and 
deduced, to intuition and imagination. Their essences are concealed by 
layers of relations and meanings that usually prevent us from getting in 
touch with those original, pure representations. Therefore, in order to build 
true knowledge about the “external” reality, we must first remove those 
layers: we must go back “to the things themselves”. 
Husserl’s original ideas were further developed not only by himself, 
over the period of his life, but also by several other philosophers in the last 
century (see SPIEGELBERG, 1971). This long debate generated different 
approaches to phenomenology, with somewhat different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. One of the most prolific streams of 
phenomenological research has its bases on Heiddeger’s views and the 
existentialist movement. It is often referred to as phenomenological 
psychology or existential-phenomenological psychology (e.g., VON 
ECKARTSBERG, 1998), and has been evolving through the contributions of 
thinkers such as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, 
Gadamer, and Ricoeur (SPIEGELBERG, 1971; VON ECKARTSBERG, 1998). 
Existential-phenomenological psychology is concerned with the study 
of meaningful human experiences, as they unfold in relation to and within 
a particular socio-historical context. Its emphasis is on “how we read, 
enact, and understand our life-involvements” (VON ECKARTSBERG, 1998, 
p. 3). The inherent interconnection between consciousness, intentionality, 
the individual and his/her physical body, and the natural, social and 
historical environment where our experiences take place motivates and 
guides research within this stream of phenomenology. The acknowledgment 
and embrace of this interrelationship emerges from the appropriation of 
different ideas, such as Heidegger’s concepts of being-in-the-world, 
Sartre’s fundamental project and the maxim that “existence precedes 
essence”, and Merlau-Ponty’s denial of the possibility of a total 
presuppositionless vantage point and his concept of embodied subjectivity. 
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In existential-phenomenological research, the duality between individual 
and external reality gives place to a fundamental relationship of co-
constitution, in which body and consciousness are inseparably engaged in 
the meaning creation process. This relationship is not one of determination, 
but rather of alternatives and choices uniquely perceived, defined, and 
exploited by each individual, consciously, rationally, or not, as s/he moves 
along the flow of her/his life’s specific situations. 
The fundamental goal of empirical existential-phenomenological 
research is to arrive at an essential general meaning structure of a 
phenomenon in terms of a synchronic formulation of essential constituents, 
as well as at a process structure of the phenomenon that delineates its 
diachronic unfolding in terms of essential stages aligned sequentially (VON 
ECKARTSBERG, 1998). Although slightly different research methods have 
been used in the literature (e.g., VAN KAAN, 1966; GIORGI, 1985, 1997), 
all of them seem to follow the same basic structure, which is described by 
von Eckartsberg (1968b) as follows: 
1. Problem and question formulation: the researcher delineates the 
focus of investigation, naming the phenomenon of interest in such a 
way that it is understandable to others. 
2. Data-gathering situation: descriptive narratives provided by the 
participants about their experiences are collected as textual format, 
written by the participants themselves, transcribed from interviews, 
or both. All accounts of the phenomenon should be considered in 
this pre-reflective collection of information, least important textural 
characteristics of the phenomenon are overlooked. 
3. Data analysis: the analysis aims at unveiling the structure, meaning 
configuration, principle of coherence, and circumstances of 
occurrence and clustering of participants’ experiences. Implicit 
meanings are brought out by means of systematic reflection upon 
participants’ life-texts or memories. Throughout this process, the 
researcher retains the focus on the phenomenon of interest, 
attempting to uncover the connections between the narrated 
experiences and the situated and essential general structure of the 
phenomenon. An important element of this process is the use of 
imaginative variation, described by Moustakas (1994) as follows: 
The task of Imaginative Variation is to seek possible meanings 
through the utilization of imagination, varying the frames of 
reference, employing polarities and reversals, and approaching the 
phenomenon from divergent perspectives, positions, roles or 
functions. The aim is to arrive at structural description of an 
experience, the underlying and precipitating factors that account 
for what is being experienced; in other words, the “how” that 
speaks to conditions that illuminate the “what” of experience. How 
did the experience of the phenomenon come to be what it is? 
(pp. 97-98) 
4. Presentation of results: the findings are formulated and expressed in 
public form for sharing and criticism. They are synthesized in an 
account of the “essential constituents” of the phenomenon (what 
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was experienced), as well as their internal relations with one another 
(how it was experienced). 
It is important that existential-phenomenological researchers adopt 
the phenomenological attitude when approaching a research project (e.g., 
GIORGI, 1997; VON ECKARTSBERG, 1998). This attitude is attained through 
Epokhé, a process of deep self-examination, whose ultimate goal is the 
identification and inhibition of all commitments associated with the 
“natural attitude”, the biases of everyday knowledge, as a basis for truth 
and reality. The focus of the phenomenological research must be “placed 
in brackets” (bracketing), i.e., everything else should be set aside so that 
the entire research process is rooted exclusively on the topic and question 
of interest. Although, as argued by Merlaeu-Ponty, a state of total 
presuppositionless is unachievable, the attempt to reach such goal can still 
be extremely fruitful, for: (1) it helps us develop a better understanding of 
the phenomenon under consideration; and (2) it opens us to new 
interpretations and perspectives that may emerge from the dialogue with 
the participants, and the reflection upon the accounts of their situated 
experiences. 
4 CRITICAL EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
Critical social theory and existential-phenomenological research 
appear to share similar ontological assumptions. In both traditions, reality 
is multifaceted, aggregating, in a mutually influencing way, natural and 
social elements. Their epistemological positions also seem to be compatible. 
The main interest in existential-phenomenological research is the situated 
human experience and its associated meanings. Its research methods, 
based on the interpretation of participants’ subjective accounts of their 
experiences, were conceived, therefore, to help us acquire knowledge 
about the meaning creation process. CST, on the other hand, has broader 
horizons, for it also contemplates inquiries motivated by the technical 
interest. At first, it would seem, then, that existential-phenomenological 
research is closer to pursuits associated with CST’s practical interest. 
Nevertheless, its conceptual base is also conducive to inquiries related to 
the emancipatory interest, although, in practice, it is difficult to find 
examples of the conduction of phenomenological research in this way.  
The emancipatory potential of existential-phenomenological research 
becomes evident when three of its fundamental elements are considered 
in tandem: the phenomenological attitude, imaginative variation, and the 
search for a structural account of a given phenomenon. A structural 
description focuses on the relationships between the various essential 
elements of an experience. It tries to unveil causal connections and 
interdependencies that explain why the experience unfolded in a certain 
way. It is important to highlight that those elements are interconnected in 
webs of meaning that are themselves inherently linked to meanings 
shared at a social or societal level. At a minimum, the common language 
shared by researchers and participants works to bind the constitution and 
interpretation of experiences within the limits of a certain web of socially 
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shared meanings. Nevertheless, the shared meanings can also have their 
roots in prevalent ideologies, purposefully distorted information, cultural 
traditions, and so on. In any case, life experiences and the meaning-
attribution process are inevitably connected, for, if on the one hand, living 
informs expression (language and thinking), on the other hand, thinking-
language-expression reciprocally inform and give a recognizable shaped 
awareness to living (VON ECKARTSBERG, 1998, p. 15). 
It is, therefore, in the search for interdependencies among the essences 
of an experience that overarching socially shared meanings can be 
identified and related to the meanings originally associated with the 
individual’s experience. This possibility entails the identification of webs of 
meaning that support illegitimate, but often reified social arrangements. 
Here lies, then, the transformative capacity of existential-phenomenological 
research: by defining the individual in terms of Sartre’s fundamental 
project, and calling attention to the inexorable interconnection of 
meaning, consciousness, body, and socio-historical context, it requires 
researchers and participants to acknowledge the choices and alternatives, 
as well as the meanings to which they are linked, that underlay 
participants’ present life situations and their experiences of the 
phenomena under consideration. This, however, may not happen, if the 
researcher fails to adopt a phenomenological stance, for s/he is also 
influenced by a web of meanings that is itself connected to broader, 
socially shared meanings. If these remain veiled and unexamined, aspects 
of the participants’ experiences that are also connected to those shared 
meanings can be reified and assume an unwarranted obvious, natural 
status. Once the researcher understands her/his own biases (as much as 
possible) and opens her/himself to the horizons of participants’ 
experiences (the phenomenological attitude), the meaningful essences of 
such experiences lose their once natural standing, and become object of 
deep interest and careful examination. This occurs somewhat naturally, as 
the researcher strives to describe the “how” and “why” of the experience 
of the phenomenon. As explained before, imaginative variation plays a 
fundamental role in this process. As the researcher modifies the frames of 
reference in her/his analysis, essential constituents of an experience may 
become “lose”, i.e., their formerly natural reason for being now requires 
explanation. Some of them may be grounded on webs of meaning 
associated with ideologies, distorted communication, and unjustified beliefs 
that perpetuate unfavorable life situations and social arrangements. The 
existential-phenomenological research method nudges both researcher 
and participants toward the acknowledgement of this state of affairs. This 
is the first, but necessary, step to the realization of the emancipatory 
ideals of CST. 
In short, there does not seem to be any impediments to the conduction 
of existential-phenomenological research from a critical standpoint. When 
its methods are checked against the requirements established by 
Ngwenyama (1991, pp. 272-273) for a critical research methodology, we 
notice that only the first one (“methods must be practice oriented focusing 
on change”) does not seem to be immediately fulfilled. However, as 
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explained above, it does not conflict with the fundamental principles of the 
existential-phenomenological tradition, but finds there a fertile ground 
upon which it can thrive. 
To illustrate the preceding argument, I will briefly describe my 
experience in a study of IT-driven radical organizational change (MORENO, 
2001). The research used an existential-phenomenological method to 
understand how individuals experienced the major transformation of their 
work lives occasioned by the redesign of business processes and the 
introduction of new IS in their organizations (BPR projects were used as 
the context of the study). Over 60 long, semi-structured, interviews were 
conducted, over a period of one year. Before I started the research project, 
I had a mostly negative view of reengineering and other related techniques, 
due to my previous professional experiences and background. Based on 
the news about BPR project failures that were quickly spreading at the 
time, I expected to find the same type of attitude among the participants 
of the study. Surprisingly, many of them did not share my views. Some, 
even after going through traumatic events in their companies, still 
maintained a positive attitude toward BPR and their own organizations. My 
first impulse was to reject this dissonance and attribute it to some problem 
of interpretation (mine or the participants’). In time, I practiced and 
adopted the phenomenological attitude, acknowledging, but setting aside, 
my own biases against BPR. As I opened myself to participants’ narratives, 
I was moved by a deep interest in understanding the process of their 
experiences, i.e., how their different aspects related to each other, and 
why they occurred in that particular way. This reflection transpired during 
the interviews as I continued to ask participants to detail their answers 
and dig into the reasons behind their attitudes and feelings. In my struggle 
to make sense of their experiences, I tried to adopt different perspectives 
and connect the elements of their narratives in different ways, but always 
returning to the participants themselves to validate my interpretations. 
During this process, both the interviewer and the interviewees were 
induced to reflect about their own prejudgments and beliefs (Habermas’s 
self-reflection). Some of the latter started questioning previously 
unacknowledged validity claims that were embedded in their interpretations 
of their experiences, and previous choices and positions regarding their 
jobs, their organizations, and even society in general. This “expanding” 
questioning took place when participants, in their attempts to vindicate 
those claims, were able to reconstruct and reconnect the webs of meaning 
associated with one sphere or level of their lives (e.g., their jobs) with 
overarching webs of meaning associated with broader social contexts 
(e.g., their companies, work in general, the capitalist society). In some 
cases, I noticed significant changes in the participant’s views of work, 
organizations and society (akin to Habermas’ rational reconstruction), during 
the course of the interview process (sometimes, they were distributed 
over a period of several months). For example, in my first interview with 
Louis, who was a director in a large hospital when the BPR project started, 
he had a positive opinion of reengineering, very much aligned with the 
discourse of efficiency and the technological imperative, even though he 
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had just lost his job. At that time, his work had precedence over the 
personal aspects of his life. During the interview process, Louis and I 
engaged in a deep reflection about his experiences and related beliefs, 
unveiling contradictions that had formerly been unchecked. In our last 
interview, six months later, Louis told me he had decided to become a full-
time teacher, and started coaching a T-ball team: “It was a real eye-
opener […] I don't want another job like that again. That's where [...] the 
whole thing ended.” 
5 CONCLUSION 
From the preceding exposition, it is clear then that the CST perspective 
differs fundamentally from most interpretive or hermeneutical approaches 
because it “requires the researcher to attend not only to the matter of 
mutual understanding, but also to the matter of the emancipation of 
organizational actors from false or unwarranted beliefs, assumptions, and 
constraints” (NGWENYAMA & LEE, 1997, p. 10). Critical theory addresses 
the conflictual nature of social interactions, and the possibility of the 
intentional introduction of distortions in people’s conceptualizations of reality 
as a means to favor groups or individuals’ interests. Such distortions are 
reflected on communicative acts that are false, incomplete, insincere, or 
unwarranted. Examples of recent research with such focus include Yetim’s 
(2006) paper on how meta-communication processes guided by 
discursive-ethical principles can promote a rational and legitimate 
definition, design and structuring of genres, and Varey, Wood-Harper and 
Wood’s (2002) analysis of political and ethical shortcomings related 
inherently to management and IS praxis, based on a critical 
communications theory. Insofar as hermeneutical inquiry is based on the 
merging of researchers’ and research participants’ “horizons” or webs of 
meaning, but does not critically examine these horizons in regards to their 
intrinsic validity claims, it cannot be considered a critical research method. 
Although it has been usually conducted from a hermeneutical 
standpoint, existential-phenomenological research is based on ontological 
an epistemological principles that are attuned to those of the neohumanist 
paradigm and CST. Moreover, its methodology is conducive to the 
realization of emancipatory ideals and the transformation of unwarranted 
social arrangements. In times where Information Technology, in its 
different flavors (e.g., the Internet, enterprise-wide systems, wireless and 
mobile technology, etc.), has assumed a strategic role in organizations, 
being often associated with profound changes in work, companies, and 
markets around the world, existential-phenomenological research methods 
can make a distinct contribution to the development of IS research. First, it 
can help the IS community to critically examine some of the basic 
assumptions, mostly derived from the natural sciences, that have guided 
inquiries in our field. Such assumptions – about the nature of information 
systems, the “effects” they have on organizations, how and why they are 
developed and adopted, and so on – may be shared not only by 
researchers, but also by participants, who have been consistently exposed 
to the discourse of technical rationality over the last decades. The deep, 
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encompassing examination of IS-related phenomena, at the individual 
level, supported by existential-phenomenological methods, may reveal 
new or even overlooked essential aspects of these phenomena, including 
their interrelationships with overarching social structures. Second, but not 
less important, insofar as they are applied with a critical orientation, 
existential-phenomenological research methods can be instrumental to 
the realization of emancipatory ideals in the context of IS-related and 
organizational phenomena. This is especially important in face of the 
prevalent “knowledge imperative” discourse, the transformation of labor 
arrangements, and the intrusion of work in other spheres of life. 
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